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R883Brain Evolution: When Is a Group
Not a Group?
In testing the ‘social brain hypothesis’ with comparative data, most
research has used group size as an index of cognitive challenge. Recent
work suggests that this measure is too crude to apply to a wide range of
species, and biologists may need to develop other ways of extending
these analyses.Richard W. Byrne
and Lucy A. Bates
The overall size of the brain and the
relative enlargement of its
component parts vary widely
across species. Part of this
variation can be accounted for by
allometric changes with body size,
and part by correlated increases
among many brain parts linked by
developmental constraints; but
much remains to be explained as
adaptive variation. In pinning down
the sources of this variation, the
usual approach is to seek
correlations with environmental
challenges faced by different
species. To do that, it is necessary
to index the possible challenges
in a robust and simple way, so
that a large number of species can
be included in the analysis. In this
way, social complexity, a keycognitive challenge according to
the Machiavellian intelligence
hypothesis [1], has usually
been reduced simply to group
size. Admittedly crude, this at
least captures the idea that
information-processing demands
should, on average, increase
with the number of social
relationships an individual has
to deal with [2].
Anthropoid primates are
a paradigm case where this is true
[3], and species with larger
neocortex do indeed live in larger
groups [4]. Moreover, the same
principle seems to apply in other
taxa: chiropteran bat species that
show stable social groups have
larger neocortex than those that do
not [5], and the most social
cetacean species are also those
with the largest brains [6]. There
is reason, therefore, to think thatthe selective effect on brain
enlargement from social
complexity — as measured by
group size — is a general one at
least in mammals. Recently,
Shultz and Dunbar [7,8] have
increased the level of
sophistication in such analyses
by including another measure of
social complexity: a species’ social
organization. They found powerful
effects on brain size in all taxa
analysed.
Firstly for even-toed ungulates
[7], a group with a convenient lack
of dietary complexity, and now also
for carnivores and birds [8], Shultz
and Dunbar report that, whereas
group size has weak and often
inconsistent effects on relative
brain size, a species’ social system
is closely related to the size of its
brain. Intriguingly, in these
non-primate species they found
monogamy to be more closely
associated with brain enlargement
than is group size; it was not the
highly competitive, multi-male
mating systems which were
particularly linked to brain
enlargement, but rather having
harems and especially
pair-bonding. In contrast, among
primates, multi-male mating
systems (and larger group sizes)
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R884were associated with the greatest
brain enlargement.
Do these findings invalidate
earlier work which suggested that
group size is important for a wide
range of taxa? (An implication even
of some of the authors’ own earlier
work: Dunbar and Bever [9]
reported that in carnivores and
advanced insectivores, group size
correlates with neocortex
enlargement.) Maybe not. In Shultz
and Dunbar’s recent studies [7,8],
group size was defined by the
geometric mean of reported
aggregation sizes — which may
deliver very different results in
different species, depending on the
nature of their typical groupings. As
we put it in a recent article [1], ‘‘The
logic of [Machiavellian intelligence]
theory will only apply if a social
group is a semi-permanent
aggregation. Temporary
groupings, such as flocks of
non-breeding ducks on lakes,
migrating herds of ungulates, or
fish schools attacking krill are not
predicted to have any such
selective effect on intelligence:
not all sociality is cognitively
demanding.’’ The definition of
group used in Shultz and Dunbar’s
analyses [7,8] does not exclude
such temporary groupings: they
refer to groups that are ‘‘little
more than aggregations and
exhibit a fluid structure:
individuals join and leave the
group as their needs, and the
environment, dictate’’.
So what is cognitively
demanding about some social
groupings? Nicholas Humphrey
[10] was responsible for the
seminal article arguing that social
complexity has been a major spur
to the evolution of intelligence. He
suggested some answers: ‘‘the
presence of dependants (young,
injured, infirm). conflicts of
interest among themembers of any
community which spans more than
a single generation. complex
kinship structures’’. If so,
complexity is not an automatic
consequence of the number of
individuals in a social group: a large
but anonymous aggregation may
be socially simple. Rather,
complexity is a function of the
range and subtlety of behaviour
expressed by group members [11].
Group size can therefore only bea useful proxy for social
complexity if groups are
composed of animals who know
others individually, who notice
information about others’
demeanour, rank, kinship and
past history of give-and-take, and
who use this information in social
problem-solving. Primatologists
have repeatedly emphasized that
primates compete by subtle
tactics of social manipulation far
more than most species, so it is
natural that for primates social
knowledge is at a premium even
in mating contests [12].
Shultz and Dunbar’s [7,8] work
is valuable in showing that, on the
whole, birds, ungulates and
carnivores form aggregations
that do not impose cognitive
demands: for them, evolutionary
success in a multi-male mating
system is not particularly
dependentonbrainpower,whereas
for primates it is. In primates,
‘aggregations’ are long-lasting
associations in which individuals
must continually cope with each
other’s demands, and living in such
semi-permanent groups may
impose cognitive demands on any
species. Comparing across taxa
illustrates this point. Using the
geometric mean of reported
aggregations to define a group,
red deer, eland and kob form
similar-sized groups to
chimpanzee communities and
baboon troops; reindeer are seen in
far larger groups. Yet no ungulate
zoologist would claim that these
deer and antelope have to deal
with social problems that require
knowledge of kinship, rank or past
history of give-and-take, as do the
primates. In the temporary mating
aggregations of even-toed
ungulates, disputes are settledwith
body strength and weaponry.
Amongcarnivores, counts aremore
likely to indicate semi-permanent
groups. But while badgers and
gorillas share the same group size,
most of a badger’s waking life is
spent entirely on its own, and to
develop a working definition of
group across this diverse order
may prove just as elusive.
We must be careful not to jump
to the conclusion that a
biological term, suchas ‘group’, has
the same meaning to all who use it.
Shultz and Dunbar’s [7,8] findingsemphasise the importance, in terms
of social information processing,
of coping with differentiated
relationships. Unless we can be
sure that group size is giving an
indication of the size of a social
network, its usefulness as a proxy
variable for social complexity in
large-scale comparative analyses
may have come to an end. For
taxa where group size is not
useful, other measures of
social complexity, such as
mating system, time spent
engaged in social activity, or the
particular manner in which
individuals compete, may give
more useful scales against
which to test theories of brain
evolution.
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